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Abstract—We present the first practical attack on a hardware
AES accelerator with 256 bit embedded keys using DFA. We
identify the challenges of adapting well-known theoretical AES
DFA models to hardware under attack from voltage fault injec-
tion and present solutions to those challenges. As a result, we
managed to recover 278 real-world AES-256 keys from a secure
computing system in a matter of hours with minimal cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is a wealth of work in differential fault
analysis (DFA) attacks on AES [8] and it is well understood
that such attacks works on hardware AES accelerators [10],
there has been few practical attacks on real-world targets. In
2012, Sony released their second hand-held gaming console,
the PlayStation Vita. Although it was not the runaway success
of its predecessor [13], Sony thoroughly improved the software
and hardware security features on their new console [15].
At the root of their secure boot system is a cryptographic
accelerator (only accessible by a dedicated security CPU) that
operates with keys embedded in the silicon which are not di-
rectly accessible by software. The keys can only be referenced
through hardware protected key-slots. By obfuscating the keys
this way, the designers hope that in the event that the system is
compromised and attackers wish to use the device as a black-
box to decrypt data, they can reference new key-slots in a
firmware upgrade and re-secure the system. This works as
long as both of the following points hold true:
1) The system is not compromised before it locks out the
important key-slots. The Vita will always revoke the
permission to use a key-slot when it is no longer needed.
Unused key-slots are also locked down early in the boot
process.
2) The keys themselves cannot be extracted by the attacker
even if she compromises the secure processor. Otherwise,
the permissions enforced by the cryptographic acceler-
ator can be bypassed.
It has already been demonstrated [14] that assumption 1
is broken with fault injection attacks on the secure processor
(called “F00D”) and therefore the security has already been
defeated. However, we wish to go farther and break assump-
tion 2 as well. We do just that with a DFA attack on the Vita’s
cryptographic accelerator (which we nicknamed “Bigmac”).
A. AES
The Rijndael cipher [9], known more commonly as AES,
is a substitution permutation based cipher that is widely used
This work was not supported and do not represent the approval or rights
of any third parties.
for encryption to ensure confidentiality of data. The cipher
operates in N rounds where N is 10 for AES-128 and 14
for AES-256. In each round except the last, there are four
operations performed on a 4×4 state matrix which is initialized
before the first round by each plain-text byte XORed with the
first round key. There are N+1 round keys generated through
a separate process not described here. The state operations are
defined briefly:
1) SubBytes is the substitution step where a non-linear
function is applied on the input byte.
2) ShiftRows performs a cyclic rotation on each row of
the state.
3) MixColumns linearly combines the elements in each
column. It can be represented as a multiplication of each
column with a constant matrix. This step is skipped for
the last round.
4) AddRoundKey ties the result to the key by XORing
each element with an element from the current round
key.
B. DFA
It would be remiss to not start with a reference to Boneh,
Demillo, and Lipton’s 1997 paper [6]. The authors described
how an incorrect RSA signature produced by faulty hardware
can be used to retrieve the private key. Shortly thereafter,
Biham and Shamir [5] discovered that faulty results from
symmetric encryption systems like DES can also be used
to extract the secret key. They called the attack Differential
Fault Analysis because they used the information gleaned from
related ciphertexts produced from good hardware and faulty
hardware to find the secret key.
DFA can also be applied to AES [10]. According to Dusart
et al., if the fault is modeled by a single unknown byte, ,
which is XORed into a specific element of the state matrix
before MixColumns of round N − 1, then one can solve for
four bytes of the round N key. The high level idea is that
the non-linear structure of the S-Box can be abused to leak
information about the state. As an example, Dusart presented
the following system of equations for a fault  at a fixed
location in round N − 1:
s(x0 + 2) = s(x0) + 
′
0
s(x1 + ) = s(x1) + 
′
1
s(x2 + ) = s(x2) + 
′
2
s(x3 + 3) = s(x3) + 
′
3
(1)
The S-Box of SubBytes is represented as s(x) and the
unknowns are x0, x1, x2, x3, . The observed faulty ciphertext
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difference are ′0, 
′
1, 
′
2, 
′
3. With each fault, we observe a
different set of ′ and assume a different unknown  but x does
not change. After enough samples, we reduce the solution set
to 1 and solve for x. Once the state bytes are revealed, it is easy
to extract four bytes of the round N key. Repeat the whole
procedure with faults at different offsets, and it is possible to
recover the entire round N key and going from the round N
key to the original key is just a matter of reversing the key
scheduling algorithm (which is not secret). Dusart et al. were
able to extract an AES-128 key by ”analyzing less than 50
ciphertexts.”
Recent progress in AES DFA theory since then has been
in reducing the number of needed ciphertexts [1, 12, 23]
as well as relaxing the fault model to handle more faults
(or earlier faults) [12, 16, 20]. There has also been attacks
targeting the key schedule rather than the round states [11]. In
practical attacks, AES DFA has been shown to work on ARM
processors [4], on FPGA [2], and on an ASIC [21].
C. Prior Work
Our work is closest in design to Selmane’s [21] for a
smart-card. Their target was also a dedicated AES accelerator
running alongside a CPU. They also used Piret’s model [20]
for performing the DFA attack. The method for inducing the
faults was timing violations. However, one key difference is
that they created the timing violations by under-powering the
smart-card such that the AES operations will be faulty but the
CPU can still operate correctly. Our method for creating timing
violations is from voltage glitching [14]. Under-powering does
not work for us because the global critical paths are not inside
Bigmac. When we try to under-power the device, the F00D
security processor will not execute code, and we cannot control
Bigmac. Additionally, by using a voltage fault injection, we
can create precise glitches that target specific AES rounds.
This is important for reducing the number of needed faulty
ciphertexts.
We used Piret’s model1 of a single fault between the
MixColumns of round N − 3 and N − 2 (which itself is
an extension of the original model from Dusart described
above). This model only requires two faulty ciphertexts and
the correct ciphertext to recover the final round key. We
used an implementation of the attack on this model called
phoenixAES [22]. This tool was developed as a way of
attacking white-box AES [7], but we find that it can also
process hardware generated faults without any modification.
Because it is not possible to characterize each faulty ci-
phertext as “good” or not (i.e. fits the assumptions of the
model) without knowing the key, we developed a brute force
approach to try every pairing of ciphertexts. We believe this is
similar to an approach taken by Riscure [24] but was unable
1It should be noted that more than a decade of work has taken place
since Piret’s results and there exists many AES DFA models that have lesser
requirements on the required faults. However, we were unable to find any
open-source implementation of the newer ideas. Because we can control
precisely where the fault takes place, we can make use of this constrained
model and it saves us the time of implementing our own DFA tool from
scratch.
to verify this because they did not go into details about their
implementation.
II. FAULT INJECTIONS
Piret’s fault model requires exactly one byte of the AES
state to be corrupted between the MixColumns operation of
round N −3 and N −2 [20]. To recover the round N key, we
need two different single-byte corruptions of this type. The
first practical challenge is to create fault injections that can
meet this requirement. We used voltage glitching to inject the
fault because of previous success [14] in voltage glitching the
F00D processor on the same target. Specifically, we applied
the crowbar voltage glitching technique [19] because of its
low cost and high applicability.
A. Hardware AES
Although we do not know the exact design of Bigmac’s AES
implementation, we can reasonably assume that it is optimized
in some way. We know that SubBytes and MixColumns
(as well as their inverse) are the most expensive operation [18]
and therefore it is highly likely that the critical paths are within
those operations. This means that with the right timing, we can
achieve a glitch that only affects one operation and that it is
possible to meet the requirement for a one byte corruption.2
From a software perspective, Bigmac has a simple com-
mand interface. It has memory-mapped registers accessible
only by the F00D security processor at physical address
0xE0050000. The ARM based application processor cannot
see this address range at all and must interface with F00D to
use Bigmac indirectly. Only TrustZone on the ARM processor
can communicate with F00D. Bigmac has support for AES
block modes CBC, ECB, and CTR, with key-sizes of 128,
192, and 256. In addition, it also supports AES-CMAC,
HMAC-SHA, SHA, memcpy, memset, and generating random
numbers. To perform a Bigmac operation, F00D passes in
a source and destination address, the length of the data, the
operation, and (when required) the address of the IV. For keyed
operations, Bigmac accepts either a fixed key written to a set
of input registers directly or the index of a key-slot. It is also
possible to set the output destination to a key-slot instead of
a memory address in some cases.
Each key-slot has a permission bit associated with it. Some
key-slots are only allowed to encrypt data to another key-slot.
We call these “master” key-slots. It is normally not possible
to directly observe ciphertext produced by encrypting with
a master key. There are 30 master keys in the PlayStation
Vita, some of which are device unique and others which
are common to all Vita devices. There are 250 additional
non-master key-slots (some device unique) not derived by
software that we can directly observe the ciphertext. Finally,
the remaining key-slots are either derived from the master keys
2Ideally we can glitch only for the duration of one operation, but optimized
AES implementations typically perform all four operations of a round in
one or two cycles. However, because we know that the path length for each
operation is not equal, we do not run into the awkward situation of faults
occurring in multiple operations, which does not meet our requirement for a
single byte fault.
along with data from the firmware or loaded directly from
software decrypted by Bigmac. Key-slots can also be disabled
such that they cannot be used until the next reset. Most keys
including all master keys are disabled early in boot before the
operating system is loaded.
The results of this paper include the procedure we devised
to obtain 248 non-master keys and all 30 master keys by
leveraging DFA, code execution through voltage glitching, a
hardware vulnerability, and the computation power of about
500 core-hours.
B. Glitch Parameters
The effects of crowbar voltage glitching depends largely on
two factors: when the crowbar circuit is activated and how
long it stays activated [19]. To reduce the variance in our
measurements, we replace the target’s external clock input
with our own clock running at f = 12 MHz. Bigmac runs
with a clock derived from the external clock with frequency
fc. From measurement of Bigmac’s AES timing, if we assume
that one AES round takes one clock cycle, then fc = f .
Our glitching hardware also runs with a clock derived from
the same source with frequency fg = 4f . When we refer to
“cycles”, it is in units of 1/f .
Since we are dealing with AES-256, it is necessary to re-
trieve two round keys in order to recover the full key [10]. This
means we need to find two sets of parameters: nN−2,mN−2
and nN−3,mN−3. We define n to be the offset from a fixed
trigger signal before the AES engine starts to the crowbar
activation and m to be the duration of the crowbar activation.
Since we are applying Piret’s model, this means we have to
target round N − 2 and round N − 3.
III. SETUP
Boot time code execution is a prerequisite for interfacing
with Bigmac before the target key-slots are disabled. We
reproduce the setup described in [14] to achieve this. As
such, we make use of the ChipWhisperer Lite, an open source
hardware fault injection and side channel analysis tool. We
designate, through a series of scripts, two separate modes
of operation. In boot mode, we configure the ChipWhisperer
to perform the previously described voltage glitch attack on
F00D to gain early boot execution. Once that succeeds, we
load an RPC payload that interfaces with the ChipWhisperer
through UART serial and enter DFA mode. In DFA mode, we
send the plaintext through the serial port and use the RPC
interface to set up Bigmac and toggle a GPIO pin before
starting the AES operation. Then we perform a voltage glitch
using ChipWhisperer by waiting n cycles after a GPIO toggle
to activate the glitch circuit and turn it off after m cycles.
The device will then return the output ciphertext through the
serial port. The same glitching hardware is used with different
configurations for the two modes. We will only describe our
setup for DFA mode.
A. Reducing Capacitance
To minimize the impact of the power distribution network
(PDN), we make a couple of modifications to the PCB. First,
Figure 1. 1000 samples at 12 MHz done three times. The GPIO toggles on
at 0 and off at 600. The entire 14 rounds of AES takes place in the “dip”
around 250.
we trace and remove every decoupling capacitor to the core
1.1V voltage domain. Figure 4 shows the capacitors that were
removed.
Next, we introduce a 10 Ω shunt resistor3 by cutting the
trace from the device’s own power management chip to the
main SoC (figure 5). We designed a simple board (figure 6)
that contains the shunt resistor, a filter capacitor, and ports for
an external power supply, a measurement probe, and a SMA
connector to the ChipWhisperer to perform the voltage glitch.
B. Measurements
On the target device, we use our RPC interface to toggle a
GPIO pin and immediately start the Bigmac AES operation.
Using a CW501 differential probe for ChipWhisperer sampling
at f , we capture the power trace triggered by the GPIO pin.
Using these traces, we can get a rough idea of when the AES
operation takes place.4 Figure 1 shows what the traces look
like.
C. Encrypt vs Decrypt
When we targeted the AES-ECB-256 encrypt operation,
we ran into issues with the corrupted ciphertext that we
suspect was due to both the AES state operation and the key
scheduling being faulted at the same time.5 It is likely that the
key scheduling was taking place in parallel with the encrypt
operation. When we target the AES-ECB-256 decrypt oper-
ation, the issues we observed dramatically decreased, which
confirms our hypothesis. As a matter of convention, we will
continue to refer to the AES engine output as the “ciphertext”
and the round number in reference to the encryption round
even though our fault injection was on the decrypt operation.
3Originally we attempted to do a DPA attack but gave up after a couple
of months without any results. We believe that because the AES engine
was designed for power efficiency, the SNR was too low to get accurate
measurements for this device and 10 Ω was the highest shunt we can choose
that still allows the device to operate. The same shunt resistor was used for
the DFA attack because it was already in place. There is no solid evidence that
the shunt resistor is needed for DFA, but empirical results show that without
the shunt resistor in place, the minimum width of the glitch needs to be about
3x as much for the system to show any faulty behavior.
4Another reason for the low SNR that made DPA difficult was due to the
fact that the DMA reads and writes dominates the spikes we see (not AES
rounds). We confirmed this by running AES-ECB and AES-CBC and noticed
that two extra spikes appear for reading and writing the IV from memory.
After setting the destination to a key-slot (instead of SRAM), we observe
half as many spikes.
5Our simple analysis fails if the key schedule was also faulty.
Table I
SAMPLE ANALYSIS
Decrypt Output m n
Corrupted Bit Mask Round Operation
9E8EDBEBE1CF276208912BB325CF6E7F - -
00000000000000000000000000000000 - -
5FF5D6AEADFF594817F4FB3F565EB5F1 282 1
00000000000000400000002000000000 3 MixColumns
6D139A0FB71775A4C55F8E6C2B88162B 281.5 1
00004000000000000000000000000000 4 MixColumns
F3B414E25E4CF5B1D7CEA101C61A9A3C 281.5 1
00014203000020200000000000000020 4 MixColumns
9D7CEF8A3B9E222FAC826D6E21BC6BC3 279.5 1
00104000000000000004101200000060 7 MixColumns
A1A68EFB05B99D0E7C1C18328265F2BD 279.5 1
00104000000000000000000000000020 7 MixColumns
621A9AE2F689F316DC1C8BA8F5794C4C 277.5 1
00004000000000000000000000000000 10 MixColumns
53BA4B36688166424E5E7ACEFBDF8357 276.75 1
18021209000000000000000000000020 11 MixColumns
48E042EB3A7E7015C8293C85089F615E 275.5 1
00000000000000000000000000000004 13 MixColumns
Selected sample analysis results from AES-256 decrypting in-
put 00000000000000000000000000000000 with key-slot
0x3FF. The first row is the expected output while the remaining
rows are results from a fault at offset m with width n. The mask
shows which bits in the AES state was corrupted. The round and
operation is the step where the AES state was corrupted.
D. Simple Analysis
By injecting faults at offsets 240 < n < 280 and width m =
1 we were able to observe faulty ciphertexts. However, most of
the faulty texts were not at the right round and therefore cannot
be used for Piret’s DFA model. Normally, this would not be
an issue as we can just throw out results that fail the attack,
however for reasons that will be made clear later, it is to our
advantage that we maximize the probability that each faulty
ciphertext could be “useful.” To do this, we need to constrain n
more and identify the precise round that each n value affects.
Following the idea in [25], we setup Bigmac with a known
key and then perform a faulted decrypt operation. Then we try
to encrypt (the inverse operation) the faulty ciphertext with
the same key and identify the first step where the state got
corrupted.
More specifically, we design an analysis script that performs
two AES encrypt operations in parallel: one on the expected
ciphertext and one on the faulty ciphertext. After each step,
we count the number of bits that differ in the state, and
we return the round and step that has the least number of
different bits. This works with high probability because AES
is designed to have diffusion, so each step after the fault would,
on average, be more different from the step before it. Table I
shows some example output from this analysis. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of where the fault was seen and figure 3 shows
the distribution of the number of bits corrupted.
We notice that for certain value of m (such as the
ones shown in table I), we are able to cause faults in the
MixColumns of a specific round the vast majority of the
time. This is evidence that our glitching setup is robust and
precise enough to perform Piret’s DFA attack.
Figure 2. Distribution of the round operation faulted by the glitch. The
operation number is in order of an encrypt round. 1 is SubBytes and 3
is MixColumns.
Figure 3. Distribution of the number of bits in the state corrupted. The
majority of the corruptions are a single bit.
IV. ATTACK
With the offsets found from the analysis (table II), we can
collect faulty ciphertext which are (with high probability) from
the required round. However, there is no guarantee that the
faults are only a single byte or that we can cause two different
single byte faults per round. Therefore, we need to do some
post-processing.
A. Filtering out multi-byte corruptions
Recall that Piret’s model requires two different single byte
corruptions to recover a single round key. However, as ob-
served in table I and figure 3, the structure of our faults appear
to be 1-5 bits flipped. If all the bits flipped are inside a single
Table II
GLITCH PARAMETERS
AES-128 AES-256 AES-256
Fixed Non-master Slot Master slot
nN−2 270.75 271.5 282.25
nN−3 270.25 272.25 281.5
Offsets found for three kinds of operations: AES-128 encrypt with
a fixed key (only used for debugging our setup), AES-256 decrypt
with a non-master key-slot, and AES-256 decrypt with a master
key-slot. Glitch width is n = 1 for all cases.
byte, then we are good. However, it is clear that not every
faulty ciphertext has the bit flips confined to a single byte.
Fortunately, this is an easy problem to solve. The DFA
attack will fail (no solution to the equations) if the wrong
faulty ciphertexts are used. Therefore, if we collect M faulty
ciphertexts, we can just attempt the DFA attack with all(
M
2
)
= O(M2) possible pairings.
B. Using multi-byte corruptions
The above works well, and we were able to recover a
many key-slots with enough samples. For the remaining key-
slots which we were unable to find a pair of required faulty
ciphertexts after hours of sampling. We have to improvise
another workaround.6
First, notice from table I that the mask of corrupted bits
show some bits are more likely to be flipped than others—
even if the fault happens in different rounds. The explanation
for this phenomenon is the physical hardware data path for
each bit of the state is not equal. We mentioned previously that
certain operations (such as MixColumns) are more likely to
fault because the data paths are longer than those of other
operations and that makes a timing violation more likely.
However, even within MixColumns, there are differences in
the data path for each bit of the state.7
Given a collection of faulty ciphertexts, we define a “static
fault” to be any bit corruption that is common to all the
ciphertexts and a “dynamic fault” to be the bit corruption(s)
that only occur in only some faulty ciphertexts.
1) Second Order DFA: We claim that any number of static
faults do not affect the results of DFA. Taking any existing
AES DFA technique and it is possible to relax the requirement
for a “correct” ciphertext to that of one that only contains static
faults.
We prove this claim for Dusart’s example DFA attack on
round N − 1. Let matrix Sr,Op be the correct state at round
r with operation Op and let Fr,Op be the faulty state matrix.
Matrix Z contains the static faults (up to 16 bytes) and A0 is
the matrix constant for MixColumns.
Z =

ζ1 ζ2 ζ3 ζ4
ζ5 ζ6 ζ7 ζ8
ζ9 ζ10 ζ11 ζ12
ζ13 ζ14 ζ15 ζ16

A0 =

2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3
3 1 1 2

(2)
Let  be a single dynamic fault at byte 0. We show the effect
of the faults in the last two rounds:
6We could have implemented a different DFA fault model which is less
constrained but it was easier to improvise a more inefficient method.
7Predicting which bit is more likely to flip is difficult because it is data
dependent as well as process dependent.
FN−1,ShiftRows = SN−1,ShiftRows + Z +

 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

FN−1,MixCol = SN−1,MixCol +A0 · Z +A0 ·

 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

FN−1,AddKey = SN−1,AddKey +A0 · Z +

2 0 0 0
 0 0 0
 0 0 0
3 0 0 0

FN,SubBytes = SN,SubBytes +

′0 0 0 0
′1 0 0 0
′2 0 0 0
′3 0 0 0

FN,ShiftRows = SN,ShiftRows +

′0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ′1
0 0 ′2 0
0 ′3 0 0

FN,AddKey = SN,AddKey +

′0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ′1
0 0 ′2 0
0 ′3 0 0

With s(x) being the AES S-Box, we can find the following
equations (on x0, x1, x2, x3, )
s(x0 + 2+ 2ζ1 + 3ζ5 + ζ9 + ζ13) =
s(x0 + 2ζ1 + 3ζ5 + ζ9 + ζ13) + 
′
0
s(x1 + + ζ1 + 2ζ5 + 3ζ9 + ζ13) =
s(x1 + ζ1 + 2ζ5 + 3ζ9 + ζ13) + 
′
1
s(x2 + + ζ1 + ζ5 + 2ζ9 + ζ13) =
s(x2 + ζ1 + ζ5 + 2ζ9 + ζ13) + 
′
2
s(x3 + 3+ 3ζ1 + ζ5 + 2ζ9 + 2ζ13) =
s(x3 + 3ζ1 + ζ5 + 2ζ9 + 2ζ13) + 
′
3
(3)
The trick here is that all the ζ terms are constant and with
a change of variable, we get Dusart’s original equations.
s(x′0 + 2) = s(x
′
0) + 
′
0
s(x′1 + ) = s(x
′
1) + 
′
1
s(x′2 + ) = s(x
′
2) + 
′
2
s(x′3 + 3) = s(x
′
3) + 
′
3
(4)
The upshot is that any implementation of Dusart’s attack
as well as Piret’s improvements (which is what we used)
can be applied unmodified8 on ciphertexts with static faults.
This means we can make use of a greater number of faulty
ciphertexts without having to keep sampling and changing the
input until we hit a lucky 1 byte fault. Since we do not know
8In this attack, it is no longer true that invalid candidates will yield no
solution. We ran into this issue on a small percentage of key-slots we attacked.
which faulty ciphertext has only static faults, we try every
possible combination of 3
(
M
3
)
groupings with one candidate
as the static-only faulty text. With this one weird trick, we
were able to fully recover the remaining non-master key-slots.
C. Targeting master key-slots
Up until this point, we focused on non-master key-slots.
Recall that master key-slots have an additional level of ob-
fuscation: the engine does not directly reveal the ciphertext
output. Instead, the engine writes the output ciphertext to
another key-slot (which is not readable) to be used as a
new key. Luckily, this security measure has already been
cracked by David “Davee” Morgan [17] who found a hardware
vulnerability in Bigmac. The last ciphertext is not cleared from
the engine’s internal state and the next invocation of the engine
with an input of size < 16 bytes will “borrow” the remaining
bytes from the ciphertext of the last successful operation. We
can extract the ciphertext output of a master key operation
with the following steps:
1) Perform a faulty AES-256 decrypt using the master key-
slot and any slave key-slot as the destination. Due to the
vulnerability, a copy of the faulty ciphertext will remain
in the AES engine’s internal state.
2) Using a known fixed key, AES-128 encrypt a buffer of
4 bytes of 00 to memory. Save the resulting ciphertext,
C3.
3) With the same fixed key, AES-128 decrypt C3, which
restores the internal state.
4) Repeat steps 2-3 with 8 bytes and 12 bytes of 00 to
produce C2 and C1.
5) Finally, use the slave key-slot to encrypt 16 bytes of 00
to produce C4
We can then do a 232 brute-force on C1 to find the first 4
bytes of the faulty ciphertext (since we used a fixed key, and
we know that 12 bytes of the input are 00). Then we can use
the 4 known bytes and C2 to find the next 4 bytes and repeat
with C3 to find the next 4 bytes. Finally we brute force the
“key” used to produce C4 with the first 12 bytes we found
and a 232 brute-force of the remaining 4 bytes. This gives a
worst case of 4∗232 = 234 AES operations to retrieve a single
faulty ciphertext.
Using the c5.18xlarge instance on Amazon Web Ser-
vices EC2 which provides 72 CPU cores [3], each faulty
ciphertext retrieval takes an average of 15 seconds and the
worst case of under a minute. After obtaining the faulty
ciphertexts, we can perform the same DFA attack on the master
slots as with other slots.
D. Results
With the phoenixAES library implementation of Piret’s
attack along with our brute-force enhancements, we able to
use our round N − 2 faults to obtain the round N key and
then use the round N − 3 faults to obtain the round N − 1
key.9 Combining both gives us the full AES-256 key.
We were able to carry out the attack successfully on all 278
key-slots we have access to (including all 30 master key-slots).
There are two key-slots, used for the device unique eMMC
full-disk-encryption, that are locked out before we can gain
code execution. In theory, it should be possible to perform
the same attack by writing to the eMMC with our RPC (the
FDE is done in hardware and is transparent to software) and
dumping the result with an external flasher. However, we do
not attempt this because of the extra overhead involved and the
fact that the keys are device unique and therefore not useful
to have.
V. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that AES DFA attacks do work
well in practice, although some extra work was required. It
is particularly attractive for devices like the PlayStation Vita
where the software has been security-hardened. The entire
cost of this attack was surprisingly low. ChipWhisperer Lite
and CW501 differential probe costs about $300. The custom
boards and components for glitching and triggering costs less
than $10 total. 500 core-hours of partials busting on AWS EC2
costed us about $10. Even including the extra equipment used
during the development and debugging such as a 100 MHz
oscilloscope and extra Vita motherboards, the entire cost of
the attack was easily under $1000. We believe that all modern
SoC should, if they do not already, defend against DFA attacks
because these attacks are not just theoretical. The PlayStation
Vita used hardware AES keys as a way of protecting the
software, but because they did not also protect the hardware as
well, all their defenses crumble with a precisely timed voltage
spike.
AVAILABILITY
All our work are available as open source projects.
1) The F00D RPC payload and ChipWhisperer scripts to
run the RPC and collect faulty ciphertexts: https://github.
com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/
2) AES fault analysis script for finding where
the fault occurs given a known key: https:
//github.com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/tree/
master/scripts/analysis
3) DFA attack script based on phoenixAES
including the second order DFA enhancements:
https://github.com/TeamMolecule/f00dsimpleserial/tree/
master/scripts/dfa crack
4) Master key-slot ciphertext brute force with AES-
NI support (thanks to “Davee”): https://github.com/
TeamMolecule/f00d-partial-buster
9With the round N key, we can reverse a single round of AES for the
correct ciphertext along with every faulty ciphertext. Then we just run the
same DFA attack with the new sample set to get the round N − 1 key.
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APPENDIX
A. PCB Modifications
Figure 4. The decoupling capacitors for the core 1.1V voltage domain removed are boxed in red. The two external clock input pads are boxed in yellow (the
clock synthesizer chip is removed).
Figure 5. The back of the board where the 1.1V supply trace is cut in order to isolate the regulator from the SoC.
Figure 6. The psvcw board glued to the under-side of the Vita motherboard. SMA connector goes to ChipWhisperer glitch module. The left pins go to an
external 1.1V supply. The right pins go the differential probe. On the bottom of the board are two wires that are soldered to ground and the top portion of
the cut trace. The shunt resistor is 10 Ω and the bypass capacitor is 10 µF. Boxed in orange is the GPIO output from the device used as a trigger.
